Complementarities are once again evident in Provine's review of Purves & Lichtman's Principles of Neural Development,here between behavior analysis and the methods, concepts and phenomena of contemporary neuroscience. Provine makes clear that a Skinnerian science of behavior does not inherently conflict with a science focused on precise details of brain-body relationships (as opposed to the loose metaphors that characterize most brain-based explanations in psychology).

Dews deals with related themes in Thompson & Schuster's Behavioral Pharmacology. Even at the time of the review, behavioral techniques for assessing pharmacological effects had begun to challenge traditional categorizations of psychological process and physiological mechanism. The questions raised about assumed functional differences between perception and action, between aversively and appetitively motivated behavior and between depressive and anesthetic effects of drugs are still relevant.

Another link between psychology and biology involves instinctive behavior, an area of special disagreement between researchers from differing traditions. Behavior analysts emphasize environmental determinants and generality across species, consequently deemphasizing species-specific behavior patterns. Ethologists, on the other hand, start from behavior patterns peculiar to particular species, to be understood in relation to specific evolutionary niches. Psychologists with biological but not necessarily physiological emphases (comparative psychologists in earlier decades and psychobiologists or biopsychologists in more recent ones) have emphasized constraints on conditioning and other "contributions of the organism" to its behavior.

Schwartz targets a book, Seligman & Hager's Biological Boundaries of Learning,that represents biological constraints as a major embarrassment to learning theories, including behavior analysis. As Schwartz compellingly shows, the core concept for legitimizing biological constraint, that of preparedness, depends on behavioral procedures, distinctions and concepts for its very legitimacy. Schwartz also identifies subtle conceptual issues in the relation between behavior inside and outside the laboratory and in the drawing of distinctions between natural and contrived situations.

The background of Schwartz's discussion is not only the issue of constraints but also a history of implacable hostility between ethological and behavior analytic traditions. In reviewing Tinbergen's The Animal and its World, Shettleworth considers specific products of phylogenic selection, which most ethologists emphasize, and processes of ontogenic selection, which some learning theorists emphasize. In discussing observing responses, pattern discrimination, generalization, and sequencing within behavioral chains, she notes differences in approach that have divided the two fields. For example, ethologists define behavior patterns topographically rather than functionally, whereas behavior analysts give only secondary importance to structural constraints that are central to the ethological approach.

Species peculiarities emphasized by ethologists and general principles emphasized by behavior analysts combine in the working conditions of animal trainers, as Squier describes in reviewing Pryor's Lads Before the Wind, an engaging account of her work with marine mammals. While it is entertaining to see how characteristics peculiar to these species can be accommodated, Squier notes that a good deal is also to be learned about general principles, by explicitly integrating the art of training with the science of behavior.

Crawford, in a review that was stimulated by Krebs & Davies' Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach,identifies an informal alliance in basic research, between biologists working in behavioral ecology and behavior analysts studying choice in laboratory settings. He explores the developing synthesis between theories of optimal foraging and behavioral formulations emerging from studies of conditioned reinforcement and choice. By noting distinctions such as that between translation, whereby a single experiment is interpreted from both theoretical viewpoints, and "true simulation," where contingencies are explicitly arranged to mimic conditions assumed to exist in the wild, Crawford helps the parties to walk into this potential marriage with their eyes open.

Finally, Catania's review of Bowler's Eclipse of Darwinism provides historical perspective on the problems and prospects of behavior analysis within the context of the surrounding culture and its philosophical traditions. The misunderstandings and mischaracterizations that early Darwinians encountered resemble in obvious ways those that behavior analysts have often endured. More important, contemporary positions can be seen as analogous to those in the century-old Darwinian struggle, such as assumed inner directive forces in orthogenesis and internal representations implicit in Lamarckism. The dynamics of argument that Bowler describes remain current. Perhaps the behavioral sciences will one day catch up to biology in recognizing the significance of the selecting role of the environment and the pitfalls of placing ideology ahead of data.