Malone, J. C. (2004).
Modern molar behaviorism and theoretical behaviorism: Religion and science.
Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior,
82, 95-102.
Baum and Staddon disagree on the status of internal states in behavior analysis.
Baum advocates molar behaviorism, treating behavior in temporally extended segments
and so avoiding the need for internal states. Staddon argues that internal states
merely represent the effects of different histories and that their use brings behavior
analysis in line with the established sciences. The dispute is one form of the
age-old molar-molecular controversy that characterized Aristotle’s disagreement with
Plato. Both molar and molecular analyses have their place, but molar behaviorism
may apply more naturally to a variety of phenomena, ranging from the matching law
and avoidance learning to so-called “higher mental processes.” When molecular
analysis involves internal states, as in Staddon’s Theoretical Behaviorism (or New
Behaviorism), misunderstanding will be inevitable and behaviorism will be seen as
one more instance of the mediational theories in which psychology has long been
mired. Such theories have long dominated the physical sciences, where their usefulness
is indisputable, but psychology is far behind the physical sciences and nonmediational
molar behaviorism better suits a discipline that lacks the methods and the data of the
established sciences.
Key words: theoretical behaviorism, molar behaviorism, molecular behaviorism,
internal states